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understanding,	 Christ	 is	 derivatively,	 rather	 than	 fundamentally,	
located	in	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine,	such	that	Christ	is	present	
to	 the	 believer	 through	 the	 consecrated	 bread	 and	 wine,	 thereby	
making	available	to	the	believer	a	second-person	experience	of	Christ,	
where	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	the	way	in	which	she	shares	










































with	 answers	 tending	 to	 fall	 into	 two	 groupings:	 either	 identity,	 where	 the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine	is,	in	some	way,	Christ	himself,	or	symbolic,	where	the	
consecrated	bread	and	wine,	in	some	way,	symbolize	Christ.	In	this	paper,	we	present	
a	 new	way	 of	 understanding	 this	 relation,	 namely,	 iconic,	 where	 the	 consecrated	
bread	 and	wine	 serve	 as	 icons	 of	 Christ.1	 On	 this	 understanding,	 the	 consecrated	
bread	and	wine	are	ways	of,	and	occasions	for,	a	second-person	experience	of	Christ,	
whereby	the	communicant	shares	attention	with	Christ.	We	motivate	this	account	by	





1.	 God’s	 omnipresence	 and	 Christ’s	 ‘real	 presence’	 in	 the	
Eucharist	
	
With	 respect	 to	 every	 place,	 God	 is	 present	 there,	 or	 so	 says	 the	 doctrine	 of	
omnipresence.	And	if	presence	implies	location,	as	it	seems	to	do,	then,	with	respect	



























Both	 approaches	 have	 their	 recent	 champions.	 Hud	 Hudson	 (2009,	 2014),	 Inman	
(forthcoming),	 Robert	 Oakes,	 (2006)	 and	 Alexander	 Pruss	 (2013)	 defend	
fundamental	location	accounts	of	God’s	omnipresence,	while	William	Lane	Craig	and	
J.P.	 Moreland	 (2003),	 Joshua	 Hoffman	 and	 Gary	 S.	 Rosenkranz	 (2002),	 Eleonore	
Stump	 (2010,	 2013),	 Richard	 Swinburne	 (1993),	 Charles	 Taliaferro	 (1994),	 and	
Edward	Wierenga	(2010)	defend	derivative	location	accounts	of	God’s	omnipresence.		
	 We	 can	 understand	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	
Eucharist	in	similar	terms.	One	way	for	Christ	to	be	really	present	in	the	Eucharist	is	
for	him	 to	be	present	 in	 the	 consecrated	bread	and	wine,	 and	 so	be	 located	 in	 the	















2.	 Fundamental	 location	 accounts	 of	 the	 real	 presence	 of	
Christ	in	the	Eucharist	
	














occupied	by	 the	 consecrated	bread	 and	wine.	But	 how	 could	Christ	 be	 so	 located,	























































virtue	of	 the	positions	of	 their	parts,	 but	 that	does	nothing	 to	 show	 that	 shape	 is,	
therefore,	not	intrinsic.	Theodore	Sider’s	words	are	apposite:	
	
…’intrinsic’	 is	 partially	 a	 term	 of	 art.	 Everyday	 use	 and	 the	 notion’s	
intended	 theoretical	 application	 provide	 some	 non-negotiable	
constraints	on	how	any	notion	deserving	 the	name	must	behave.	On	






moral	 to	 draw	 from	 the	 discussion	 is	 to	 deny	 that	 which	 is	 forcing	 the	 problem,	















reappearing	 at	 an	 earlier	 time	 alongside	 an	 earlier	 incarnation	 of	 themselves.	
Presumably	they	can	do	this	any	number	of	times,	and	so	it	is	possible	for	one	and	the	














first	 distinguish	 between	 two	 different	 possible	 interpretations	 of	 time	 travel,	

























wine	 are	 identical?	 Christians	 who	 believe	 in	 the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	
Eucharist	 often	 speak	 of	 ‘the	 two	 species	 of	 the	 Eucharist’.	 It	 seems	 difficult	 to	





first	 involve	distinguishing	between	A	 and	B,	 and	 this	 raises	 the	problem	all	 over	
again.	





satisfy	 (WP),	 Pruss’s	 definition	 of	 whole	 presence.	 However,	 opponents	 of	 multi-


















confront	 his	 proposal.	 However,	 the	 reliance	 of	 this	 account	 on	 both	 the	 logical	
possibility	 of	 time	 travel	 and	 multi-location,	 both	 of	 which	 face	 well	 known	
objections,	 is	 inescapable	 and	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 serious	 cause	 for	 concern.	We	









a	 derivative	 location	 account,	 one	 on	 which	 the	 consecrated	 bread	 and	wine	 can	
occasion	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 experience	 of	 Christ,	 namely,	 a	 second-person	
experience	of	Christ,	that	is,	the	consecrated	bread	and	wine	are	a	mode	of,	and	an	














occasion	 for,	 a	 second-person	 experience	 of	 Christ.	 To	 unpack	 this	 view,	 we	 first	
explain	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 second-person	 experience	 by	 employing	 Stump’s	 (2010)	
analysis	of	this	concept.	We	then	discuss	how	spiritual	practices	can	occasion	second-













in	 and	 present	 at,	we	 can	 also	 add	 a	 kind	 of	 second-personal	 presence,	 namely,	
present	to.	This	kind	of	presence	is	lacking	when	someone	is	present	in	a	space	and	
at	 a	 time	 but	 isn’t	 present	 to	 the	 other	 persons	 in	 the	 room.	 For	 instance,	 to	 use	
Stump’s	example,	we	might	say	that	‘She	read	the	paper	all	through	dinner	and	was	
never	present	to	any	of	the	rest	of	us’	(2013,	64).	What	is	lacking	here	isn’t	the	agent’s	
presence	 in	 a	 space	 or	 at	 a	 time,	 but	 rather,	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘second-personal	






















Christ’s	 presence	 in	 a	 place	 or	 at	 a	 time	 which	 is	 important,	 but	 rather,	 Christ’s	
presence	 to	 the	 individual	 through	 a	 kind	 of	 attention	 sharing.	 As	 Martin	 Luther	
writes	in	his	discussion	of	Christ’s	presence	at	the	Eucharist,	‘it	is	one	thing	if	God	is	
present,	and	another	if	he	is	present	for	you’	(1961).4	This	presence	to	an	individual	
is	the	kind	of	presence	we	think	that	 it	 is	 important	to	explain.	How	can	we	adopt	
Stump’s	account	of	attention	sharing	to	our	understanding	Christ’s	presence	in	the	



















sharing	attention	with	Christ,	 consider	another	application	of	 the	 second-personal	
model	 of	 religious	 experience,	 namely,	 Green	 and	 Quan’s	 (2012)	 account	 of	
experiencing	 God	 through	 Scripture.5	 According	 to	 Green	 and	 Quan,	 one	 way	 of	
understanding	the	claim	that	God	is	present	in,	and	speaking	through	Scripture	is	to	
maintain	that	Scripture	gives	us	a	mode	of,	and	an	occasion	for,	a	shared	attention	
experience	with	God.	First,	 it	will	be	 important	 to	give	a	more	detailed	account	of	
shared-attention.	As	Green	and	Quan	outline	it,	‘shared	attention	occurs	when	one	is	
engaged	in	an	act	of	attending	to	something	and,	in	doing	so,	one	is	cooperating	with	
another	 who	 is	 engaged	 in	 a	 parallel	 act	 of	 attending.	 Shared	 attention	 involves	
coordinated	 “attention-focusing”’	 (2012,	 419).	 This	 kind	 of	 shared	 attention	 can	
either	be	dyadic,	in	which	case	two	individuals	focus	attention	only	on	one	another,	
or	 triadic,	 in	which	case	both	attendants	 focus	on	an	 independent	object	or	event.	


















to	use	her	abilities	 to	engage	 in	shared	attention	as	mediated	by	 the	
subtitles	to	attend	to	the	zucchini	bake	pictured	on	the	screen.	She	then	
















Alex	wins	 a	 private	 cooking	 lesson	with	 Rachael	 Ray.	 He	 is	 deaf,	 so	
Rachael	communicates	with	him	using	written	notes.	At	a	certain	point	
in	 the	 lesson,	 she	hands	him	a	note	 that	 reads,	 “Consider	 the	golden	






genuinely	 sharing	 attention	with	 another	 person.	 Becky’s	 reading	 of	 the	 subtitles	
allows	her	to	focus	on	the	object	of	attention	which	Rachel	Ray	wishes	her	audience	




note	 is	 an	 example	 of	 dyadic	 shared	 attention	 in	 which	 Alex	 and	 Rachel	 share	
attention	with	one	another.		
	 These	examples	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	distinction	which	Green	and	Quan	
make	 between	 ‘genuine’	 and	 ‘pseudo’	 shared-attention.	 Pseudo-shared-attention	










be	 empowered	 by	 the	 note	 to	 have	 dyadic	 and	 triadic	 shared	




An	 instrumental	 shared-attention	 experience	 is	 different	 from	 a	 pseudo-shared-
attention	experience	in	that	it	alerts	Alex	to	an	actual	agent	(Buddy)	who	is	available	
to	share	attention	with	him.		
	 With	 these	 distinctions	 outlined,	 Green	 and	 Quan	 consider	 the	 theological	
claim	that	God	speaks	through	or	is	present	in	the	text	found	in	Scripture.	According	
to	Green	and	Quan,	if	text	can	allow	us	to	share	attention	in	various	degrees	with	other	
persons,	 then	the	same	can	be	 true	of	God.	For	 instance,	one	might	have	a	kind	of	













and	 speaking	 through	 Scripture.	 Pseudo-shared-attention	 is	 possible	 with	 other	
literary	 texts,	 such	 as	 Plato’s	 account	 of	 Socrates	 in	 the	 Republic,	 for	 example.	
However,	‘[t]he	Christian	tradition	appears	to	assert	that	Scripture	is	unique	in	that	
God	is	actually	present	and	speaking	in	Scripture,	not	just	that	Scripture	lends	itself	
toward	 imagining	 that	God	 is	present	and	speaking’	 (2012,	425).	Thus,	Green	and	
Quan	 claim	 that	 Scripture	 can	 also	 act	 as	 an	 instrumental	 shared-attention	







Much	 like	Rachael	Ray	hands	Alex	a	note	about	 the	zucchini	bake	 to	
direct	 his	 attention	 to	 the	 zucchini	 bake	 in	 Case	 2,	 so	 God	 might,	
through	the	Scriptures,	direct	one’s	attention	to	one’s	pride.	Just	as	Ray	
































Ray.	 All	 of	 the	 above	 examples	 of	 sharing-attention	 involve	 persons	 who	 are	
fundamentally	located	nearby	to	one	another.	However,	we	have	claimed	that	Christ	
cannot	be	fundamentally	located	in	the	Eucharistic	meal.		
	 Whilst	many	 of	 the	 examples	 given	 by	Green	 and	Quan	 are	 cases	 in	which	
persons	 can	 direct	 perceive	 one	 another,	 nearness	 of	 fundamental	 location	 is	 not	





be	 communicated.	 […]	 [U]sing	 the	 shared-attention	 account,	we	 can	
claim	 that	 sound,	 light,	 and	 affect	 are	 all	 mediums	 that	 can	 be	
manipulated	by	God	in	such	a	way	as	to	reveal	the	mind	of	God	toward	
the	subject	of	 the	experience.	The	subject	hears	the	sound	of	a	voice	














perception	 of	 the	world,	 but	 unlike	 all	 of	 the	 above	 examples	 of	 shared-attention	





if	 text	 can	 allow	 us	 to	 share-attention	 with	 another	 person	 (including	 a	 divine	
disembodied	person),	then	so	too	can	an	object	or	an	event,	we	think.	Green’s	model	
of	 mystical	 experience	 can	 be	 extended	 beyond	 sharing-attention	 through	 text.	














Recently,	 they	 have	 been	 having	 difficulties	 in	 their	 marriage,	 but	
decide	to	devote	the	evening	to	spend	together.	Alex	comes	in	the	room	









mutual	 focus	 on	 an	 object	 allows	 for	 Alex	 and	 Rachael	 to	 share-attention	 both	
dyadically	 (mutual	 awareness)	 and	 triadically	 (mutual	 object	 awareness),	
furthermore	 it	 is	 an	 experience	 which	 allows	 Alex	 to	 communicate	 something	










the	 significance	 of	 Alex’s	 reconciliation	 meal	 with	 his	 wife.	 The	 Eucharist	 is	 a	




reconciliation	 meal,	 clearly	 propositional	 content	 isn’t	 necessary	 for	 this	 kind	 of	
attention	sharing.	Through	the	Eucharistic	elements,	the	participant	is	able	to	focus	
her	attention	on	Christ	in	a	way	which	is	very	similar,	albeit	in	some	ways	different,	
to	 that	 of	 the	way	 text	 can	 occasion	 attention	 sharing	 between	 persons.	 Notably,	
however,	 as	 with	 Alex	 and	 Rachael’s	 meal,	 what	 is	 communicated	 isn’t	 a	 set	 of	

















of	 the	 claim	 that	 Christ	 is	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 only	 a	 constitutive	 shared-
attention	experience	will	do.	So	whilst	pseudo	and	instrumental	experiences	might	
enable	an	individual	to	eventually	experience	Christ	constitutively,	they	won’t	count	
as	 examples	 of	 Christ	 being	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 by	 being	 present	 to	 the	
participant.		
	 First,	then,	it	is	obvious	that	participation	in	the	Eucharist	can	occasion	an	‘as	










is	 With	 Us’	 (Common	 Worship	 2000,	 176).6	 These	 two	 kinds	 of	 experience	 seem	
uncontentious,	 but	 not	 sufficient	 for	 the	 account	 of	 derivative	 presence	 we	 have	
defended.		
	 For	 the	model	 we	 propose,	 it	 is	 important	 not	 only	 that	 the	 participant	 is	
reminded	that	Christ	is	present,	but	also	that	she	actually	experiences	him	as	being	
present.	 Much	 like	 Alex	 and	 Rachael	 share	 attention	 which	 is	 focused	 on	 a	
reconciliation	 meal,	 Alex	 and	 Christ	 must	 share	 attention	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	
Eucharistic	meal,	which	is	able	to	bring	about	reconciliation	between	them.	Clearly,	
unlike	with	Rachael,	Alex	cannot	share-attention	with	Christ	by	means	of	eye	contact,	






























	 Whilst	 the	 Eucharist	 always	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 occasion	 this	 kind	 of	
constitutive	 shared-attention	 with	 Christ,	 it	 might	 not	 always	 be	 successful	 in	
producing	the	rich	kind	of	experience	described	by	a	genuine	dyadic	or	triadic	shared-
attention.	Communicants	may	enter	into,	and	experience	this	union—the	richness	of	











some	minimal	 degree	 the	 essential	 aspects	 of	 the	meal	 Jesus	was	 instituting	 (the	
experiences	 of	 the	 need	 for	 redemption,	 of	 God	 as	 the	 provider	 of	 redemption,	 of	
participation	in	the	security	of	covenantal	relationship,	and	of	eschatological	hope)	
then	Christ	has	been	truly	present	and	the	Eucharist	has	been	truly	celebrated.8	
	 In	 the	 concluding	 sections	 of	 this	 paper,	 we	 address	 two	 important	 issues	
which	face	an	iconic	model	of	Christ’s	presence	in	the	Eucharist.	First,	we	respond	to	








	 One	 advantage	 of	 focussing	 on	 the	 actual	 interpersonal	 interactions	
experienced	is	that	we	are	able	to	connect	the	experience	and	benefits	of	participation	
in	 the	Eucharistic	meal	with	 the	 interactions	 and	benefits	 occurring	 in	 the	 rest	 of	
Christian	spirituality,	both	within	a	sacramental	framework,	and	beyond.9	The	nature	

















nature	 of	 interaction	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 in	 prayer,	 worship,	 holy	
contemplation	or	any	other	activity	that	admits	of	the	possibility	of	experiencing	an	
intimate	encounter	with	Christ.	Thus,	the	Eucharist	isn’t	different	in	kind	from	any	
other	 form	 of	 sacramental	 (or	 otherwise)	 union.	 This	 invites	 the	 question:	 What	




name	 but	 a	 few	 examples),	 then	 there	 is	 nothing	 unique	 or	 distinctive	 about	 the	
Eucharistic	sacrament.	
	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 of	 what	 makes	 the	 Eucharist	 special,	 it	 will	 be	




	 While	 the	 clear	 focus	 on	 Christ’s	 work	 on	 the	 cross	 provides	 a	 special	
opportunity	 to	 be	 sensitive	 to	 experiencing	 Christ	 in	 the	 aspects	we	have	 already	













participation	 in	 a	 prayer	 retreat	 with	 a	 group.	 Space	 doesn’t	 permit	 us	 to	 give	






































and	wine	 along	with	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 their	 representative	 function	 as	 the	
body	of	Christ	and	the	blood	of	the	new	covenant	respectively.	The	elements	have	a	
powerful	 symbolic	 function	 that	 goes	 beyond	 corporate	 storytelling	 or	 provoking	
reflection.	 In	 receiving	 the	 elements	we	 accept	 Christ’s	 offer	 of	 himself	 through	 a	
tangible	physical	expression.	This	goes	beyond	our	acknowledging	that	we	have	in	
the	 past	 accepted	 Christ	 as	 saviour,	 and	 is	 a	 present	 act	 of	 reception	 that	 we	
communicate	to	God,	in	the	presence	of,	and	with,	our	spiritual	community,	through	


































involve	 both	 parties,	 and	 become	 real	 through	 their	 manifestation.	 Without	
participation	 of	 both	 persons,	 they	 remain	 a	 subjective	 imagining	 within.	 Love,	
companionship,	comforting,	encouragement,	and	so	on	are	relational	because	 they	
find	 a	 cooperative	 manifestation	 that	 not	 only	 communicates	 the	 content	 of	 the	
relational	interaction,	but	also	is	that	interaction.	So	also	in	experiencing	the	offer	and	








of	 Christ.	 It	 isn’t	 strictly	 true	 to	 say	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 located	 in	 the	
elements—at	least	this	isn’t	true	at	face	value	as	matters	are	not	that	straightforward.	
The	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 located	 in	 the	 interaction	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	
communicant—the	 real	 presence	 of	 Christ	 is	 manifested	 and	 experienced	 in	 this	
interpersonal	 union.	 However,	 for	 the	 communicant,	 this	 relational	 interaction	 is	





































	 As	 Charles	 Davis	 (1968)	 suggests,	 in	 a	 transignificationist	 view	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	 it	 is	 correct	 to	 say	 that	 the	 elements	 are	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	
because	what	something	 is,	 considered	 in	 terms	of	what	 role	 it	plays	 for	us	as	we	
interact	with	it,	is	a	matter	of	how	we	treat	that	thing.	Thus,	the	referring	terms	we	
use	 to	 denote	 objects	 are	 correctly	 applied	 by	 analysing	 whether	 those	 objects	




















questions	proposed	by	Michael	Dummett	 (1987)	as	a	 test	of	 the	acceptability	of	 a	
theory	 of	 presence	 in	 the	 Eucharist.15	 Dummett	 suggests	 that	 the	 answer	 to	 the	
question	 of	whether	 the	 elements	 are	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ	 should	 be	 an	
unqualified	‘yes’.	Furthermore,	the	ability	to	provide	this	answer	should	depend	on	a	

















last	 two	 paragraphs	 should	 have	 made	 clear,	 it	 is	 correct	 for	 us	 to	 say	 that	 the	
elements	are	the	body	and	blood,	and	that	the	real	presence	of	Christ	is	manifest	in	















Christ	 is	 present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 an	 account	 of	 Christ’s	
fundamental	location	in	the	elements	faces	difficulties.	In	contrast	to	a	fundamental	
understanding	 of	 Christ’s	 presence,	 we	 have	 argued	 for	 a	 derivative	 account	 of	
Christ’s	being	present	to	the	individual	in	which	the	elements	serve	as	mode	of,	and	
an	 occasion,	 for	 a	 second-personal,	 shared-attention	 experience	 with	 Christ.	 This	
receptionist	view	describes	the	Eucharist	as	a	sacrament	 in	which	the	participants	
engage	with	and	interact	with	Christ	as	a	living	person.	And	thus,	as	well	as	avoiding	
the	metaphysical	 difficulties	 associated	with	 fundamental	 accounts,	 a	 receptionist	
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